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In this paper, we present the evaluation and experimental results of secured robot control
in a P2P system. The control system is based on JXTA-Overlay platform. We used
secure primitives and functions of JXTA-Overlay for the secure control of the robot
motors. We investigated the time of robot control for some scenarios with different
number of peers connected in JXTA-Overlay network. All experiments are realised in a
LAN environment. The experimental results show that with the join of other peers in
the network, the average time of robot control is increased, but the difference between
the secure and unsecure robot control average time is nearly the same.
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1 Introduction
Presently most of the P2P research field has pushed through problems related to the security.
P2P systems benefit from high scalability and fault tolerance. Unfortunately in the context
of security this is also one of the main disadvantage. Usually there are no central authorities
for the verification and enforcement of policies. Security is a fundamental quality criteria in
P2P Systems. Fulfilling certain security goals is a vital precondition for the preparation of
P2P Technology for larger business applications.
Today research is focused on the design, implementation and deployment of full featured
P2P networks that integrate end devices. P2P platforms are a good approach for e-learning
and robot control [1].
Robots are rapidly expanding into human environments by interacting, exploring and
working with the humans. The new generation of robots will increasingly touch people and
their lives [2]. They can be used in situations where it is too dangerous, expensive, tedios and
complex for humans to operate. The successful introduction of robots in human environments
will relay on competent and practical systems that are safe and easy to use.
In this paper, we present a secure robot control application based on JXTA-Overlay P2P
platform. This platform is implemented in JAVA language. Thus, it does not depend on
the Operating System (OS). We used secure primitives and functions of JXTA-Overlay for
the secure control of the robot motors. We investigated the time of robot control for some
scenarios with different number of peers connected in JXTA-Overlay network. All experiments
are done in a LAN environment. We evaluated the proposed system by many experiments and
have shown that in the proposed system the security has a cost at the application efficiency by
adding some overhead in the time of robot control, but JXTA-Overlay can be used successfully
to control robots in real time.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the related work.
In section 3, we introduce JXTA Technology. Section 4 provides a description of the JXTA-
Overlay. In Section 5, we present JXTA-Overlay security. In section 6, we present application
of secure JXTA-Overlay for robot control. In Section 7, we discuss the experimental results.
Finally, conclusions and future work are given in Section 8.
2 Related Work
In this section, we discuss the related work for robot control and security in P2P systems.
Developing a multi-robot control architecture has been the subject of several studies.
Asama et al. proposed ACTor-based Robot and Equipments Synthetic System (ACTRESS)
[3]. The ACTRESS architecture tackles the issues of communication protocols with different
abstraction levels, path planning, and task assignment through multi-stage communication
protocols. The architecture was tested on heterogeneous mobile robots performing complex
object pushing tasks that cannot be accomplished with a single robot.
GOFER is another distributed multi-robot problem solving architecture [4]. It is based on
a centralized task planning and scheduling module, which keeps track of the task allocation
and the availability of all the robots through direct communication with them. The system
also uses conventional artificial intelligence and task allocation algorithms, such as Contract
Net Protocol to dispatch the subtasks to be performed by individual robots. Despite its
satisfactory performance in applications, like following a wall and pushing objects, most of
E. Spaho, K. Matsuo, L. Barolli, F. Xhafa, J. Arnedo-Moreno, and V. Kolici 229
the GOFER implementations involved no more than three robots. In addition, GOFER is
designed for indoor environments only and its dependence on a centralized task planning
and scheduling module represents a major limitation from a flexibility and fault-tolerance
perspective.
The ALLIANCE architecture [5] emphasizes some key features in the design of multi-
robot coordination architectures with a particular focus on fault-tolerance, reliability, and
adaptability. The architecture is designed for small to medium-sized teams of loosely cou-
pled heterogeneous mobile robots operating in dynamic environments to perform tasks with
possible ordering dependencies. The ALLIANCE architecture also assumes that the robots
are probabilistically capable of assessing the performance of their actions as well as those of
others through perception and broadcast communication.
There are some other research works that deal with the autonomous distributed robot
systems. In these systems, many autonomous mobile robots cooperate together to carry out
complicated tasks [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. By using many robots in a distributed way, the robot
functions can be simplified and the system cost, fault tolerance and flexibility can be improved.
In the case where there are many robots and if one robot has a problem, the other robots can
cooperate to finish a requested task. Therefore, the distributed robot systems are better than
single robots. However, in distributed robot systems, to realise a common task, the robots
should cooperate together and consider not only their own task but also the complete task.
Security is one of the key issues when evaluating a P2P system and a security baseline
must be kept in any P2P system in order to ensure some degree of correctness even when
some system components will not act properly. A survey regarding security in P2P systems
can be found in [12].
For message security, the JXTA reference implementation [13] provides two mechanisms:
TLS (Transport Layer Security) and CBJX (Crypto-Based JXTA Transfer) [14]. The former
provides private, mutually authenticated, reliable streaming communications, whereas the
latter provides lightweight secure message source verification (but not privacy).
JXTA provides its own definition of standard TLS as a transport protocol. The JXTA
definition of TLS is composed of two subprotocols: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS
Handshake Protocol. The TLS Record Protocol provides connection security using symmetric
cryptography for data encryption. The keys for this symmetric encryption are generated
uniquely for each connection and are based on a secret negotiated by the TLS Handshake
Protocol. In addition, the connection is reliable by including message integrity check using a
keyed MAC.
On the other hand, CBJX is a JXTA-specific security layer which pre-processes messages to
provide an additional secure encapsulation, creating a new message that is then relayed to an
underlying transport protocol. The original message is signed and an additional information
block is also added to the secured message. This information block contains the source peer
credential, both the source and destination addresses, and the source peer ID.
In order to use both mechanisms, TLS and CBJX, a specific group membership service
is required: the Personal Security Environment (PSE). The membership service is one of the
JXTA core services, taking care of group membership and identity management by providing
each group member with a credential. Peers may include credentials in messages exchanged
within a group in order to prove membership and provide a means for implementing access
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control in offered services. However, PSE solely supports on X509 certificates as credentials
and Java keystores as a cryptographic module [15].
3 JXTA Technology
JXTA technology is an open and innovative collaboration platform. It consist of six protocols
that allow different types of peers to communicate and collaborate among them. The main
purpose of JXTA is to built P2P systems that offers the basic functions for P2P communication
[16]. JXTA realizes this issue working and resolving three main problems of the existing P2P
networks:
1. OS independence,
2. Language independence,
3. Providing services and infrastructure for P2P applications.
3.1 JXTA Architecture
JXTA has a structure with three layers, as shown in Fig. 1. The system is designed in a
modular way to let the developers to choose the set of services that satisfy their needs [17].
1. The Core Layer. This layer implements the essential set of primitives that are common
to P2P networking. These primitives includes creation of peers, discovery, transport,
peer groups and communication even behind firewalls or NAT. The JXTA core inculdes
also basic security services.
2. The Services Layer. This layer implements some services that are integrated to
JXTA. These services include searching and indexing, file sharing, protocol translation,
authentication and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) services, as well resource search.
3. Applications Layer. This layer implements applications that are integrated to JXTA,
such as P2P instant messaging, file sharing and content management.
The distinction between services and final applications may not always be clear, since
what a client may consider an application may be considered a service by another peer. For
that reason, the system is designed in a modular way, letting developers choose the set of
services and applications which most satisfy their needs. All JXTA components are within
these three layers [18].
3.2 JXTA Protocols
JXTA comprises a set of six open protocols that allow devices with different software to
collaborate. A peer can implement one of these protocols and they can ask the other peers
for supplement functionalities. Below is a brief description of these protocols.
Peer Resolver Protocol (PRP) - Allows a peer to send a search query to another peer.
This protocol is a basic communications protocol that follows a request/response format. The
resolver is used to support communications in the JXTA protocols like the router and the
discovery protocols. The resolver also allows for the propagation of queries. For example, if
a peer receives a query and does not know the answer, the resolver sends the query to other
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Fig. 1. JXTA architecture.
peers. This is an interesting feature, especially because the originating peer does not need to
have any knowledge of a peer that may actually have the result to the query.
Peer Information Protocol (PIP) - Allows a peer to learn about the status of an-
other peer. The information protocol is used partially like ping and partially to obtain basic
information about a peer’s status.
Pipe Binding Protocol (PBP) - It is used to create a communications path between
one or more peers. A pipe is a virtual channel between two peers. The protocol is primarily
concerned with connecting peers via the route(s) supplied by the peer endpoint protocol.
Rendezvous Protocol (RVP) - The RVP is responsible for the propagation of the
messages in JXTA groups. The RVP defines a base protocol for peers to send and receive
messages inside the group of peers. This protocol controls how the messages are propagated.
Endpoint Routing Protocol (ERP) - Is used to find available routes to route messages
to destination peers. The protocol uses gateways between peers to create a path that consists
of one or more of the pipe protocols suitable for creating a pipe. The PBP uses the list of
peers to create routes between peers.
Peer Discovery Protocol (PDP) - Allows a peer to discover other peer advertisements
(peer, group, service, or pipe). This protocol uses a searching mechanism to locate informa-
tion. The protocol can find peers, peer groups, and all other published advertisements. The
advertisements are mapped to peers, groups, pipes or other resources.
4 JXTA-Overlay
JXTA-Overlay is a middleware built on top of the JXTA specification, which defines a set
of protocols that standardize how different devices may communicate and collaborate among
them. It abstracts a new layer on the top of JXTA through a set of primitive operations and
services that are commonly used in JXTA-based applications and provides a set of primitives
that can be used by other applications, which will be built on top of the overlay, with complete
independence. JXTA-Overlay extends JXTA protocols with the goal of overcoming some of
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its limitations: the need for the developer to manage the presence mechanism, peer group
publication and message exchange. To achieve this, JXTA-Overlay provides a set of basic
functionalities, primitives, intended to be as complete as possible to satisfy the needs of most
JXTA-based applications.
4.1 JXTA-Overlay network
In a JXTA-Overlay network, the main interacting entities are as follows.
• End-users, they connect to the JXTA-Overlay network by authenticating using a user-
name and password. Once the authentication process is successfully completed, they
are organized into different overlapping groups, so only members of the same group
may interact. It is also important to take into account that JXTA-Overlay end-users
are mobile, they may connect at different times using different client peers, as well as
may be connected through several client peers at the same time.
• A client peer represents an application, which end-users use to communicate and share
resources between themselves, effectively acting as end-user proxies within the JXTA-
Overlay network. They forward end-user data to client peers that belong to end-users
of the same group and authentication data to a broker. A client peer is assumed to
belong to the same groups as its current end-user.
• Brokers control access to the network, requesting end-user authentication, and help
client peers interact between themselves by propagating their related information. Bro-
kers are very important since they exchange information about all client peers, main-
taining a global index of available resources, thus allowing all peers to find network
services. Brokers also act as beacons which client peers which have recently gone online
use to join the network. For that reason, they usually have well-known identifiers, such
as a DNS name or a static IP address.
All the information related to user configuration (username, password and group member-
ship) is stored in a special single entity within the JXTA-Overlay network: a central database.
Only brokers may access the database data, in order to check end-user authentication attempts
and organize them into groups.
4.2 Architecture of JXTA-Overlay
The architecture of the JXTA-Overlay middleware defines three modules, which let the dif-
ferent entities communicate: the Client Module, the Broker Module and the Control Module.
Altogether, they form an abstraction layer on top of JXTA. JXTA-Overlay architecture is
shown in Fig. 2.
• The Client Module defines all necessary primitives for peer clients to join a JXTA-
Overlay network and interact with other peers and the broker. Applications developed
on top of JXTA-Overlay are always based on the invocation of Client Module primitives
defined and the processing of events thrown upon primitive execution or a broker re-
sponse. Primitives are comprised for: peer discovery, peer resources discovery, resource
allocation, task submission and execution, file/data sharing discovery and transmission,
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Fig. 2. JXTA-Overlay architecture.
instant communication, peer group functionalities and, monitoring of peers, groups, and
tasks.
• The Broker Module defines all the functions that client peers may call upon a broker
in order to be granted access to the network, create and publish groups or retrieve other
client-peers information. Functions produce a reply from the broker to the calling client
peer. Broker functions are always called as a result of Client Module primitives.
• The Control Module acts as an intermediate layer between the Broker and Client
Modules, providing the generic functionalities for group management and messaging.
The Control Module provides messaging between JXTA-Overlay entities using JXTA
pipes, a virtual communication channel between peers. Client peers have an input pipe
for each group it belongs to, so other group members may send messages using the
input pipe associated to that group. Brokers have an input pipe which is shared for all
incoming messaging.
5 JXTA-Overlay Security
Some of the security concerns in JXTA-Overlay are shown in the following.
• No Privacy: Transmitted data may be easily eavesdropped, since no data privacy
is provided. Even though it may be argued that data privacy in message exchanges
between end-users is just an optional feature, there are some cases where privacy should
not be optional, namely the initial authentication username and password. Currently,
both fields are sent as plain text. Therefore, any device at broadcast range may read
this information with a network protocol analyzer (such as Wireshark).
• Advertisement Spoofing: Any legitimate user may forge advertisements with no
fear of reprisal. No integrity or source authenticity is maintained. False fields, such as
the source client peer identifier or any statistics information, may be added into the
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advertisement, which will be automatically distributed by the broker and accepted by
all group members, unaware of the false data it contains [19].
• Broker Impersonation: Client peers connect to a self-proclaimed broker, but never
check if it is a legitimate one. Even in the case that client peers are connecting to
the proper broker address, there are no guarantees that the broker is a legitimate one,
since it may be that traffic is being redirected to a fake one via methods such as DNS
spoofing.
To solve these problems is used a secure architecture.
Client Application
Client
Secure Primitives
Secure Manager
Broker
Control
JXTA
Secure Adv Adv Signer Crypto Manager
Cryptographic
    Module
Secure Functions
Fig. 3. Security architecture for JXTA-Overlay.
5.1 Secure Architecture Overview
The main concepts of security for JXTA-Overlay are presented in Fig. 3. The following
modules are specified as an extension of JXTA core protocols and are not JXTA-Overlay
specific.
• Crypto Manager provides an abstraction layer for the cryptographic module and key
management method. Crypto Manager is completely modular and accepts different
implementations, according to the needs of the specific cryptographic module being
used for any particular deployment of JXTA-based application.
• Secure Adv defines the secure advertisement format and provides a method for key
transport and additional fields related to its signature.
• Adv Signer manages JXTA advertisement signature and validation by interacting with
Crypto Manager.
The JXTA-Overlay specific modules are:
• Secure Manager is the common to all interface additional security capabilities within the
JXTA-Overlay Control Module, operating as a single entry point for all secure services.
• Secure Functions and Primitives modules just extend the base Broker and Client Mod-
ules, providing a set of additional primitives and functions which take into account
security considerations.
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5.2 Secure Messenger Primitives
JXTA-Overlay has 122 primitives and 84 events related to different functions. We will focus on
messenger primitives which send simple messages between end-users. Messenger primitives
define how to directly exchange simple text messages between end-users. For instance, in
Robot Control, commands are sent using these primitives. Once the cryptographic set-up has
established key and credential information for all participating entities, it is finally possible
to secure data exchanges by providing a secure version of each primitive. The two main
messenger primitives are:
1. sendMsgPeer : Sends a simple message to some other client peers.
2. sendMsgPeerGroup: Sends a simple message to all members of a group. It is actually
resolved by iteratively calling sendMsgPeer.
The secure versions of both primitives provide lightweight privacy, data integrity and
message source authentication in a stateless, best effort method. This is in contrast, for
example, with JXTA’s secure pipes, which rely on TLS and require some previous negotiation
between endpoints each time a message exchange is initiated [20]. The necessary steps for
some end-user connected to client peer A to send a simple text message to another one
connected to B are:
1. A retrieves B’s Pipe Advertisement. This step also happens in the original insecure
primitive and thus means no additional burden.
2. A validates the advertisement signature in order to ensure that it has not been compro-
mised. If the signature does not validate, the advertisement has been tampered, and
is deemed invalid. If the message is sent, no guarantees can be made on regards to its
security.
3. A retrieves PKB from the signed advertisement’s enclosed credential, C
B
redBr
.
4. A−→ B : {EPKB (m,SSkA(m))}.
5. B decrypts the message using SKB .
6. B retrieves A Pipe Advertisement and repeats steps 2, 3.
7. B validates the message signature using PKA obtained via B’s signed advertisement.
The secureMsgPeerGroup primitive just iteratively uses the secureMsgPeer to send the
same message to a group of peers. As a standard message exchange between end-user end-
points, these primitives are mainly subject to data eavesdropping and end-user impersonation.
The former is avoided by encrypting data using a wrapped key approach, whereas the latter,
as well as data integrity, is provided by digitally signing the data. Peer encryption com-
munication system is shown in Fig. 4. In both cases, each other endpoint’s public key is
necessary in steps 1-2 (encryption) and 6 (signature validation). However, both public keys
are contained in the credential provided by the Broker at the secureLogin primitive call, and
thus, can be considered that belongs to a legitimate owner, and not an attacker.
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Fig. 4. Peer encryption communication system.
6 Application of JXTA-Overlay for secure Robot Control
The successful introduction of robots in human environments will rely on the development of
competent and practical systems that are dependable, safe, and easy to use. The ability to
interact with people in the human environment has been a recent motivator of the humanoid
robotics community and the service robotics community.
In our application, we deployed a network with three nodes as shown in Fig. 5. The
robot is connected with the broker via RS232C connector, which is a legal interface and many
devices have implemented it. We considered the robot as end-device. Peer node specifications
are shown in Table 1.
Fig. 5. P2P Robot control system.
For the experiments is used KHR-1 robot with the following specifications: Heigh 340
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Table 1. Peer node specifications.
Peer node Characteristics
Broker AMD Athlon (tm) 3200+2.01 GHz, 100 GB RAM
Peer 1 Pentium M Centrino 1.2 GHz, 512 MB RAM
Peer 2 Intel Centrino Duo 1.3 GHz, 2GB RAM
Connection 100 Mbps
mm, Width 180 mm, Depth 80 mm and Weight 1.2 kg. The robot has 17 servo-motors as
shown in Fig. 6. To create the motions we used Heart-to-Heart (motion editor for RCB-1).
A snapshot of this program is shown in Fig. 7.
RCB1
Servo Motor
Controller
Servo Motor 1
Servo Motor 2
Servo Motor 3
Servo Motor 12
motor
for PC
RS232C Socket
Fig. 6. KHR-1 Robot interface.
During the experiments are observed only the messenger primitives because the login and
connect primitives just happens once for the full session. The command of the robot control
is sent as simple message using chat service. We experimentally studied the time for Robot
Control for two different cases:
• Using sendMsgPeer primitive,
• Using secureMsgPeer primitive.
These messenger primitives define how to directly exchange simple text messages between
end-users, such as a chat service.
After the synchronisation of the time between peer nodes, the time of robot control is
measured using both primitives. Three scenarios were realised by joining peers to this network
and the times of robot control were measured.
7 Experimental Results
In Fig. 8 is shown the time for Robot Control measured for 50 experiments using sendMsgPeer
primitive (non secure primitive). While, in Fig. 9 is shown the time for Robot Control when
is used secureMsgPeer primitive (secure primitive). In Table 2 are shown the experimental
data for above experiments. For only one peer, the major part of measured time for both
cases (using unsecure and secure primitives) is less than 1 s.
In Fig. 10 is shown the average time for robot control using and not using security. As
can be observed, the difference between the average time of unsecure robot control and secure
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Fig. 7. Snapshot of Heart-to-Heart program for robot control.
Fig. 8. Experimental results for robot control using sendMsgPeer primitive.
Fig. 9. Experimental results for robot control using secureMsgPeer primitive.
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Fig. 10. Average time for secure and unsecure robot control.
Table 2. Experimental results.
No of peers Primitives Under 1s 1-3 s Over 3 s
1 Peer
sendMsgPeer 98% 2% 0%
secureMsgPeer 82% 18% 0%
2 Peers
sendMsgPeer 56% 38% 6%
secureMsgPeer 48% 46 % 6 %
3 Peers
sendMsgPeer 62% 22% 16%
secureMsgPeer 40% 36% 24%
robot control is small and with increase of number of peers the difference decreases.
From the experimental data is observed that some of the values of the time measured are
over 3 seconds. The reasons are explained in the following.
• This situation can happen because the broker is very busy. The mission of the broker
node is to manage and control all the requests received from the client peers. Broker
manages the events produced by such requests and propagates them to superior levels
of overlay. Broker performs a big number of tasks because Broker functions are always
called as a result of client primitives. Some of the broker functionalities are: event
management, controlling the resources connected to the broker, maintaining the organ-
isation of the resources in groups, finding the best resource for file sharing, finding the
best resource for executing submitted tasks, maintaining updated statistic information,
etc.
• Another reason is that JXTA-Overaly platform used in experiments has no parameter
tuning [21]. P2P applications involve many parameters, whose values cannot be arbi-
trarily fixed and they require a careful tuning to achieve expected performance. These
parameters are divided in: parameters related to the Broker peers and parameters re-
lated to the Client peers. Broker peer parameters include discovery time, publishing
time, advertisement time for broker’s statistic. High values of these parameters could
lead to an inconsistent state of the network. The small values of the parameters could
cause congestion of Brokers peers due to very frequent updates. In the case of the Client
peer the parameters include time parameters related to the peer’s advertisement, pub-
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lishing and expiration. Small values of these parameters could cause saturation of client
peers due to very frequent generation of advertisement and high traffic in the network
due to the publishing and propagation of the peer’s information. These parameters
directly relate to the time intervals for checking the state of the network, performing
action and sending state information to the network.
• Network latency that is the delay introduced by the network. Network situation such
as congestion can be a major contributing factor. Packets are forwarded from source to
destination and traverse network link including LAN switches. The combination of var-
ious latency sources such as buffering, propagating, switching, queuing, and processing
delays produces a complex and variable network latency profile.
The average time for robot control when in the network is only one peer is 0.42 s for
unsecure and 0.6 for secure primitive and for two peers 1.17 s and 1.27 s, respectively. When
in the network are three peers the time of robot control using unsecure primitive is 1.82 s
and using secure primitive is 1.88 s. When another peer joins the network, the time for robot
control for both primitives increases, because the join of other peers in the network increase
the number of requests that the client primitives send to the broker. However, the time
difference between secure and unsecure control is not significant.
From this results, we can conclude that the primitives of JXTA-Overlay sendMsgPeer and
secureMsgPeer can be successfully used to control the robot in a smoothly way. We applied
secured JXTA-Overlay architecture for the control of KHR-1 robot. In Fig. 11 from the left
to the right, we show the steps of robot during walking. In Fig. 12 from the left to the right,
we show the scenario when the robot moves the left hand.
Fig. 11. Robot walking.
Fig. 12. Robot moving the left hand.
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8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper is presented the application of JXTA-Overlay P2P system for robot control.
Specifically, we have experimentally measured the time for robot control, using two primi-
tives: sendMsgPeer and secureMsgPeer. The objective was to see the performance as well as
limitations of the P2P robot control when it is used as an end-device and the cost of using
security in robot control.
The experimental results have shown that the join of other peers in the network increase
the number of requests that the client primitives send to the broker. In this situation, the
broker should manage all requests of the client primitives, and this cause an overhead in the
time of robot control. But, with the increasing of the number of peers in the network, the
difference between the secure and unsecure average time for robot control is nearly the same.
From the experimental results, we conclude that the primitives of JXTA-Overlay sendMsgPeer
and secureMsgPeer can be successfully used to control the robot in a smoothly way.
In the future, we want to implement new secure functions and primitives for JXTA-
Overlay, which can offer several improvements of the existing JXTA-Overlay protocols and
services and increase the reliability of JXTA-based distribution applications and support
group management of file sharing.
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